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ABSTRACT
With the extraordinary rise of Emmanuel Macron and the near 
complete collapse of the Parti Socialiste (PS), the past year has seen 
arguably the most dramatic upheaval in the French party system 
since 1958. This article develops a political economy analysis of the 
Hollande quinquennat to better understand how we arrived here. It 
argues that Hollande’s programmatic failures must be situated within 
an institutional account of the constraints of the presidential logic of 
the Fifth Republic and tensions between competing factional courants 
within the Socialist Party. Here we shed fresh light on this moment 
of rupture by situating a political economy analysis of Hollande’s 
economic programme within a more intricate institutional analysis 
of the specificities of the PS and its position within the Fifth Republic. 
The article traces the most salient political developments of the 2017 
elections and outlines the political landscape of the contemporary 
French left. These factors explain why, after numerous crises of French 
socialism, this time is different.
RÉSUMÉ
L'année passée a connu l'irrésistible ascension d'Emmanuel Macron 
et l'effondrement du Parti socialiste (PS), potentiellement le 
bouleversement le plus dramatique du système des partis français 
depuis 1958. Cet article développe une analyse de l'économie 
politique du quinquennat Hollande pour mieux comprendre 
comment cette situation s’est développé. Il est nécessaire que les 
échecs du programme économique de Hollande soient situés dans 
un compte institutionnel des contraintes de la logique présidentielle 
de la Ve République et les tensions entre les courants au cœur du PS. 
Ensuite, l'article utilise ce compte pour tracer les développements 
politiques les plus profonds de la période électorale de 2017 et détaille 
le paysage politique de la gauche en France aujourd'hui. L'article 
suggère que, ce faisant, il est possible de comprendre pourquoi, après 
plusieurs crises du socialisme français, celle-ci est différente.
Introduction
The end of the Hollande quinquennat saw arguably the most dramatic upheaval in the 
French party system since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Due to Hollande’s 
deep unpopularity, for the first time in the Fifth Republic a sitting president did not run for 
re-election. The campaign itself saw the traditional bipolarity of the French party system 
shattered amidst François Fillon’s corruption scandal, and under the weight of an insurgent 
new centrist movement led by Emmanuel Macron and populist candidates from both the 
far-left and far-right. Neither candidate from France’s two traditional major parties made it to 
the second-round. Fillon, candidate of the major right-wing party Les Républicains (LR) was 
beaten to second place by far-right Front national candidate Marine Le Pen, whilst Benoît 
Hamon, of the Parti socialiste (PS) came fifth with a pitiful 6.3 per cent, eclipsed by radical left-
wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s 19 per cent. With the election of Macron as the country’s 
youngest head of state since Napoleon Bonaparte, and the parliamentary majority obtained 
by his La République En Marche! (LRM) movement (which did not even exist 15 months 
before the election), France’s electoral landscape has been turned upside-down.
This article focuses on the collapse of the PS and the disarray across the French left in the 
wake of Macron’s surge. In 2012, not only did Hollande become only the second Socialist 
President in the Fifth Republic, but the PS earned a majority of seats in the legislative elections, 
giving them control over both the Assemblée nationale and the Sénat simultaneously. Yet, 
from its most dominant control over France’s political institutions in the party’s history in 
2012, the PS in 2017 experienced a humiliating presidential debacle and the Socialists shed 
an incredible 250 seats in the parliamentary election in June. Left with a rump of just 30 
députés, the PS’s very existence is now in doubt. Furthermore the PS’s electoral wipe-out 
had significant consequences for the balance of the nation’s political divide. The left in 
France now occupies just 72 seats, compared to almost 500 for the centre, right and the 
far-right combined. So how did the PS fall so far so fast? And what do the results of the 2017 
parliamentary election mean for the configuration of the French left?
This article develops a political economy analysis of the Hollande quinquennat to 
better understand how we got here. It argues that critical failures in Hollande’s economic 
programme and governing style contributed to the contemporary parlous state of French 
socialism. Yet these failures must be situated within a set of longer-term institutional factors 
associated with the PS’s internal culture and factions, its position within the French electoral 
landscape and the specificities of political institutions. It shows how pressures posed by the 
‘presidentialising’ logic of the Fifth Republic, which has always caused tensions between and 
within the PS’s competing factional courants, came to exhaust the PS’s model of cohesion 
as developed under François Mitterrand. The rise of an insurgent centrist movement, led by 
a young and charismatic leader capable of attracting the PS’s social democratic and ‘social 
liberal’ right-wing, has pushed French socialism to breaking point. Meanwhile Mélenchon’s 
La France insoumise (LFI) movement represented a viable far left alternative, hell-bent on 
destroying the PS. Whilst the PS has experienced internal crises and significant electoral 
losses before, this combination of factors suggests that this time is different.
The article opens with an exploration of the organisational dynamics of the PS situated 
within the institutional context of the Fifth Republic and its ‘presidentialising logic’. The 
second section provides an account of Hollande’s domestic macroeconomic programme 
and his approach to renegotiations in the European Union, before a third section builds 
an account of the downfall of the Hollande administration. This analyses the long electoral 
campaign charting Hollande’s decision not to seek re-election, the selection of Hamon as PS 
candidate, the rise of Macron and the late surge in support for Mélenchon’s populist leftist 
LFI movement. A final section maps France’s post-election political landscape, underscoring 
the Socialist’s electoral collapse and existential fragility.
Assessing the Hollande quinquennat and contemporary French Socialism
Tensions within the PS’s ‘two cultures of socialism’ grew during the Hollande quinquennat 
(McDaniel 2017). As Grunberg’s (2014) account makes clear, a crisis of PS positioning within 
the French electoral politics has been apparent for some time. The rapidly evolving French 
political landscape in 2017 exacerbated these tensions, with the PS squeezed to breaking 
point, between a bombastic Mélenchon to its left and the ‘Jupiterian’ Republican monarch 
Macron in the centre-ground. Hollande’s failures must be understood in the context of a 
long-run tension between reformist and revolutionary cultures of socialism within the PS 
(Grunberg and Bergounioux 2007), which has been exacerbated by the Fifth Republic’s 
‘presidential logic’. This explains why the rise of Macron and his En Marche! movement was 
so devastating for the PS, and thus the French left as a whole.
The PS has always been an amalgamation of a number of different competing factions or 
courants, organised around personalities (notably potential future presidential candidates) as 
much as around doctrinal positions, and divided ideologically between more revolutionary 
and reformist elements of the socialist tradition. PS leadership requires a ‘synthesis’ of different 
sensibilities to be forged into a dominant internal coalition, with each camps’ policy ideas 
acting as the currency of internal wrangling. Although PS courants became less ideologically 
distinct after the 1970s, the party remained divided between its two ‘cultures’, between 
radical French socialism and the more reformist deuxième gauche (‘second left’) movement 
of Michel Rocard, closer to mainstream European social democracy in outlook and embracing 
the market economy and economic liberalism. For Grunberg and Bergounioux (2007, 7–9), 
tensions between these competing visions of French socialism created the definitional 
relationship at the heart of the PS as a party of government: between the ambition for 
governmental power, and the remorse felt by the party’s left at the realities of governmental 
compromise. Grunberg and Bergounioux suggest three stages in the recurring cycle of 
French socialism’s existence: a foundation (or re-foundation) characterised by asserting 
doctrinal orthodoxy, the compromises associated with power, and then the subsequent 
feeling of political failure and rejection of that governing record thereafter (Grunberg and 
Bergounioux 2007, 10).
Such cycles are conducive to a highly combustible political movement, and these 
dynamics are accentuated by the competitive dynamics of France’s presidentialised party 
politics. Following de Gaulle’s model, Fifth Republic parties approximate ‘presidential 
machines, whose primary function is to act as a springboard for a presidential candidacy, 
and subsequently to act as an organizational resource for the president’ (Clift 2005, 
225). The PS’s internal proportional representation system thus traditionally reinforced a 
‘presidentialised factionalism’ based around its competing courants (Clift 2005, 226). Whilst 
the PS’s factionalism is in tune with the presidential logic of the Fifth Republic, it pushed to 
the fore the need for uniting behind a single présidentiable. Rallying behind a candidate is 
one thing, but remaining united in the face of the compromises and failures of government 
is another. In the case of Hollande, the pressure exerted by the ambition to govern may have 
helped unite the Socialists in 2012, but as predicted by Grunberg and Bergounioux, the 
realities of power created deep divisions. Yet the contemporary crisis goes well beyond a 
period of ‘remorse’. The electoral basis of the PS’s governing ambitions may have collapsed. 
With Hollande’s record unpopularity, and the rise of Macron’s En Marche! movement, the 
social democratic ‘second left’ has found a new political home. With their departure, the PS’s 
hegemony on the left built by Mitterrand looks irreparably broken.
Hollande’s economic programme: aspirational Euro-Keynesianism meets 
steadfast fiscal consolidation
Hollande came to power in 2012 proposing to move Europe away from austerity policies 
through renegotiating critical elements of the EU settlement, and tackling the power of 
global financial capitalism, which his Le Bourget speech infamously described as his ‘real 
enemy’. These radical discursive flourishes of the 2012 campaign, and his more ambitious 
policy pledges, reflected the imperative of attracting leftist support. In the second-round 
run-off of the PS’s presidential primary in 2011, Hollande needed the backing from third-
placed king-maker, the left-winger Arnaud Montebourg, to defeat Martine Aubry. In the first 
round of the 2012 presidential election, Hollande reaffirmed his commitment to the anti-
austerity reorientation of Europe and his anti-finance declarations. Such Socialist doctrinal 
orthodoxy was welcomed by the PS rank-and-file. The delivery of Hollande’s macroeconomic 
programme, however, proved extremely challenging. Hollande’s radical pledges opened up 
a damaging and divisive gap between his campaign rhetoric and the reality of governance 
– a chasm which, ironically, Hollande and Lionel Jospin before him had been working hard
to close since the late 1990s.
Hollande’s economic strategy was premised upon significant renegotiation of European 
treaties, which Germany was never likely to accept. His victory was achieved amidst crisis and 
recession across the Eurozone, faltering French growth and rising unemployment. Following 
the global financial and Eurozone crises, public debt grew from around 65 per cent in the mid-
2000s to 89.6 per cent in 2012 (INSEE 2016a), the current deficit swelled from 2.8 per cent to 
5.3 per cent between 2008 and 2012 (Eurostat 2017), and in January 2012 France experienced 
the downgrading of its ‘AAA’ sovereign bond credit rating by Standard and Poor's. Interest 
rate spikes fuelled fears about debt sustainability within the Hollande camp, compounded 
by anxieties that France’s banks remained too exposed to struggling Southern Eurozone 
economies’ sovereign debt. Consequently, alongside his anti-austerity rhetoric, Hollande 
prioritised fiscal consolidation throughout his election campaign in order to comply with 
European treaty targets, and to secure ‘credibility’ with both financial markets and European 
partners (Hollande 2011; McDaniel 2014).
There were five key aspects of Hollande’s (2012, 135) EU proposals ‘for another European 
politics’, coalescing around a long-held Socialist ambition for a new Euro-Keynesian 
architecture within the eurozone. They were: the renegotiation of the new Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Compact), the creation of ‘eurobonds’, a European-wide 
financial transaction tax (EU FTT), European banking union, and a European budget for 
investment. It was clear that Berlin and Brussels would reject Hollande’s re-imagining and 
renegotiation of the Eurozone’s architecture. The day after his election, both the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker, then head of the Eurogroup, stated 
publicly that the Fiscal Compact would not be renegotiated. Sure enough, within weeks 
the Fiscal Compact was signed into French organic law without modification. At the same 
time, Hollande’s plans for eurobonds and a real ‘European investment budget’ to fund future 
infrastructure projects fell by the wayside.
It would be unfair, however, to suggest that Hollande’s European activism had no impact. 
Soon after arriving to power, Hollande threw his weight behind the idea of a banking union, 
which would not only create a single monitoring authority for European bank operations, 
but would pool the risk of default through a common bailout fund. Such a mechanism would 
effectively mutualise the cost of underwriting a crisis-ridden bank’s assets, thus breaking 
the ‘doom loop’ between fragile financial institutions and over-burdened sovereigns (Clift 
2018, chapter 7). Hollande’s proposals contributed to the creation of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, yet Berlin has been reluctant to pursue 
more ambitious measures which might expose Germany to financial risk and exacerbate 
‘moral hazard’. Hollande’s strategic failure was to rely unrealistically upon significant European 
reform to enhance France’s discretionary fiscal capacity. The unravelling of Hollande’s 
European ambitions shaped the domestic macroeconomic programme of the Hollande 
administration, which had two distinct phases.
The first phase (2012–14) saw a front-loaded fiscal consolidation premised largely on 
increased taxation. Despite his anti-austerity discourse, Hollande’s overriding goal was always 
to reduce France’s deficit and debt in line with EU targets. He pledged to ambitiously cut 
the deficit to 3 per cent by 2013 and achieve fiscal balance by 2017, whilst ensuring ‘not one 
euro more’ in debt at the end of his quinquennat. In order to reconcile such commitments 
with his anti-austerity stance, initially this fiscal effort was premised upon more progressively 
orientated taxation increases (as opposed to spending cuts). These included cancelling €29 
billion worth of niches fiscales (tax breaks), a new 45 per cent higher rate of income tax, 
reversing Sarkozy’s relief on France’s wealth tax (impôt de solidarité sur la fortune [ISF]), and, of 
course, a contribution exceptionnelle of 75 per cent on incomes over €1 m. Yet the strictures of 
an unaltered Fiscal Compact meant the Socialist administration’s domestic macroeconomic 
programme quickly altered.
By July 2012, the government had commissioned a report on French economic 
competitiveness from the industrialist Louis Gallois, which underpinned the government’s 
new ‘National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’, launched in November. 
This Pact augured steps towards supply-side policy, its central initiative incentivising hiring 
through a €20 billion tax credit reducing labour charges for businesses (crédit d’impôt pour 
la compétitivité et l’emploi [CICE]). Building upon this early shift, a second phase of Hollande’s 
macroeconomic programme began in earnest in January 2014 with the launch of the Pacte de 
Responsabilité, and lasted until the end of the quinquennat. This latter phase saw an enhanced 
role for liberalising supply-side reform alongside continued fiscal consolidation. Hollande’s 
new Pacte built upon the CICE with an additional €30 billion tax cut designed to reduce the 
cost of labour. Consistent with its aim of fiscal tightening, however, the government pledged 
a €50 billion adjustment over the period 2015–17. Given the government’s aim to shift away 
from increased taxation, after admitting it was ‘sensitive’ to the so-called ras-le-bol fiscal of the 
French people, the character of this new fiscal effort was distinct from its earlier programme. 
This time, the €50 billion would come solely from spending cutbacks (OFCE 2016, 5).
In the context of low growth across the Eurozone, Hollande failed to reach his own debt 
and deficit economic targets, whilst unemployment increased from around 9.5 to over 10 per 
cent in the same period (INSEE 2016b). Significantly, moreover, the changing distributional 
dynamic of the Socialist administration’s macroeconomic policy has had serious economic 
and political consequences. Its initial ‘tax shock’, the largest increase in taxation in post-war 
French history (Ragot 2014, 23), was responsible for slowing French economic growth by 
weighing on household purchasing power (OFCE 2016, 1). Yet tax cuts for business introduced 
since 2014 have yet to translate into significant job growth (France Stratégie 2016). This 
caused major political difficulties for a Socialist administration which struggled to articulate 
a clear or consistent vision for the economy. Fitting Grunberg and Bergounioux’s model, 
Hollande’s programmatic failings and unfulfilled election pledges were heavily criticised by 
the party’s left. In using its fiscal marge de manœuvre to deliver tax credits for businesses, and 
looking to balance these measures with further spending cuts, the Socialist administration 
opened itself up to serious parliamentary rebellion. The frondeur movement of Socialist 
deputes vociferously opposed most of the government’s economic and social programme 
from 2012. Indeed, some of the Hollande administration’s most vocal opposition came from 
these Socialist rebels.
In this context, Hollande’s failures of governing style took their toll. Inexplicably, unlike 
Mitterrand before him, Hollande did little to restrain party infighting. The frondeurs were 
constantly taking to the airwaves to decry the failings of his presidency, meanwhile Hollande’s 
economy ministers were publicly criticising each other. Successive PS First Secretaries (party 
leaders), first Harlem Désir (2012–14) then Jean-Christophe Cambadélis (2014–17) did not 
do nearly enough to maintain party discipline. Both they and Hollande failed to secure even 
a minimal non-aggression pact between the president and critical voices within ‘his’ party. 
The PS as a political organisation lacked the capacity to constrain or limit these internecine 
excesses. It turned out that the ‘synthesis’ between competing factions Hollande had 
orchestrated and held together as party leader between 1997 and 2008 was not a firm or 
viable foundation for a programme of government.
Hollande’s presidency could boast some achievements in labour market, pension and 
social policy reform (Milner in this issue), but the president never articulated a sufficiently 
clear governing vision. He never communicated, for example, the rationale behind and 
justification for the change of political economy approach from Euro-Keynesianism to supply 
side reforms. The fact that Hollande never effectively clamped down on ministerial infighting, 
combined with the cacophony of critical voices from his own parliamentary majority, added to 
the public’s impression of discord, disorder, and a presidency lacking direction. The master of 
the ‘synthesis’ lacked the requisite leadership capacities and characteristics which the French 
presidential Republic needs. Indeed, for all its antipathy to Bonapartism and presidentialism, 
perhaps the PS needs it too. The consequences of these failures of party management have 
been severe, posing a threat to the PS’ future viability as a parti d’alternance.
The end of the Hollande quinquennat: electoral collapse, reconfiguration on 
the left
The Socialist primary
After years of deep unpopularity, pressure grew on Hollande throughout 2016 to renounce the 
opportunity to stand again as the Socialist candidate. He had pledged in 2014 he would only 
do so if he succeeded in reducing unemployment, which he never managed. All sitting Fifth 
Republic presidents had stood again, but the PS leadership organised a primary election—
initially planned to boost the legitimacy of Hollande’s campaign. Despite numerous calls for 
a primary of the whole left, no agreement with the PS’s major rivals, including the French 
Communist Party (PCF), Mélenchon and Macron, was reached. Hollande’s December 2016 
decision to stand aside threw the PS into flux and opened up a rancorous debate at its heart. 
In the absence of deference to a sitting president by his or her political family, the primary 
became an acrimonious fight for the future of the party between its two ‘cultures’.
In an attempt to inject greater engagement into candidate selection, and thereby further 
embrace the ‘presidential’ logic of the Fifth Republic, the PS utilised an open primary for 
the first time in 2011. This process, which designated Hollande as the Socialist presidential 
candidate, was largely seen as a success for the party. The same could not be said this time 
around. Presidential logic pushed the PS into the primary, but, under the strain of Hollande’s 
disastrous quinquennat, the tension inherent in the party’s ‘presidentialised factionalism’ 
broke out into open warfare. Seven candidates eventually stood in the first round of the 
primary, none generating much enthusiasm. The courant infighting which underpins the 
fractious internal life of the PS shaped the competition. It bore the imprint of those PS 
big beasts, such as Martine Aubry, who had seen their ambitions dashed in recent years. 
Naturally, the primary became a contest over Hollande’s bilan. The contest was dominated 
by Manuel Valls, Hollande’s former prime minister who stood on the right of the party, 
and Arnaud Montebourg (former industry minister) and Benoît Hamon (former education 
minister), both of whom sit on the left of the party. Montebourg and Hamon had both been 
sacked from the government in August 2014 for criticising the rightward shift under Valls, and 
thus both sought to claim a rupture with the Hollande period. Valls, on the other hand, was 
characterised as the continuity candidate, despite his best efforts to downplay this image. 
In the end, the primary’s second-round run-off pitted leading frondeur Hamon against Valls, 
with Hamon winning easily, taking 58.7 per cent of the vote against 41.3 per cent for Valls, 
to become the party’s 2017 presidential candidate.
The electorate for the primary had shrunk, leaving a more left-wing core electoral base, 
which favoured Hamon (Elabe 2017). This demonstrates a weakness of the ‘primary’ system: 
particularly in instances of low voter turnout, it allows the more radical core of the party 
militants to choose a candidate whose programme may not appeal to the wider electorate. 
Secondly, the primary reveals the relative weakness and decline of the social democratic and 
social liberal right-wing of the PS, which had played a significant role in the party leadership 
and candidacies over the past decade. Organisationally the right has withered within the 
PS, whilst on the back of Hollande’s unpopularity, the left electorate was mobilised against 
a ‘social liberal’ continuity candidate.
The presidential election
The campaign for the presidential election was the catalyst for a series of ruptures within the 
PS, which continued to be played out over the summer. First, the party split over support 
for Hamon and his programme. While Valls initially undertook to back Hamon, by the end 
of March he had thrown his weight behind Macron. By this time, however, other prominent 
social liberal PS figures had already left or were leaving what they saw as a sinking ship, 
including Gérard Collomb, mayor of Lyon, and the Socialist députés Richard Ferrand and 
Christophe Castaner. They all formed part of Macron’s ‘inner circle’ of advisors. More informal 
support for Macron over Hamon came from figures including député Christophe Caresche 
and later Jean-Yves Le Drian, then still defence minister in the Socialist government. This left 
Hamon and his supporters castigating the treasonous behaviour of the PS’s progressiste wing.
Secondly, Macron’s rise facilitated a breakdown of party competition norms that had 
dominated French politics since the mid-1970s when the PS overtook the PCF to become 
the largest party of the left. Recognising the weakness of the Socialist Party and the fractured 
left more generally, Hamon’s strategy was to incarne an alliance between what was left of the 
PS support and the wider left, including Mélenchon and his LFI movement. Despite some 
agreements with ecologists – notably Yannick Jadot of Europe-Écologie-les Verts (EELV), 
Hamon’s strategic failure was not to realise the futility of his aspirations for uniting the wider 
left. There was never a realistic chance of such an alliance. Since leaving the party in 2008, 
Mélenchon has been dedicated to replacing the PS, not finding common cause with its left 
wing. Indeed, in January 2017, he spoke of a desired ‘nut-cracker’ effect on the PS; with LFI 
to the left of the PS and Macron’s En Marche! in the centre-ground, he hoped discontent 
with the Hollande quinquennat would squeeze the PS ideologically and electorally into 
insignificance. Mélenchon’s programme offered a strong retort to the perceived failures of 
the Socialist administration to fulfil Hollande’s 2012 campaign pledges. Mélenchon promised 
an ambitious Keynesian investment plan worth €100 billion financed through borrowing 
and bold redistributive measures. He also ramped up LFI’s anti-EU rhetoric in underlining 
Hollande’s failures to bring about the reforms he had promised in 2012.
Although he finished fourth, Mélenchon usurped the Socialists, taking many of its 
traditional leftist voters to become the left’s main candidate. Mélenchon’s creditable 19.6 
per cent of the vote decisively eclipsed Hamon’s desultory 6.3 per cent. On the other side of 
the coin, Macron took 24 per cent of the first-round vote, attracting the PS’s more moderate, 
social democratic and social liberal voter base. Crucially, Macron’s polling consistently 
suggested a 60 per cent plus showing in a potential second round run-off against Marine 
Le Pen. With Hamon falling in opinion polls in the weeks before the vote, the logic of the 
vote utile further pushed Socialist voters of both the left and the right towards Mélenchon 
and Macron respectively. The Socialist candidate’s historic low aligned Hamon with the 
campaign’s ‘also rans’. The nut-cracker effect had, it seems, worked.
The parliamentary election
The fallout from this Socialist dismal showing was severe, with Valls describing the party as 
‘dead’, a charge not wholly denied by the party’s First Secretary, Cambadélis, who conceded 
that a refondation of the PS, including potentially scrapping the word ‘Socialism’ from its 
name, was necessary. In a post-mortem meeting of the PS’s executive, the party abandoned 
unpalatable elements of Hamon’s leftist programme, including the universal basic income, 
taxes on robots and banking super-profits, and a ‘Citizen 49.3’. The PS legislative programme 
aligned much more closely to Macron’s, and the PS leadership chose a position of ‘autonomie 
constructive’ vis-à-vis Macron, supporting the new president on certain issues but retaining 
a critical distance, objecting to reductions in wealth taxes and flexibilising labour market 
reform.
Not all embraced this stance, however, and the PS has fractured into three distinct 
elements. Aside from the leadership’s position, a second grouping on the right, including 
a number of government ministers, openly supported Macron and his LRM movement for 
the parliamentary contest and ‘jumped ship’ for LRM. Some remained nominally ‘Socialist’ 
candidates, but caused a good deal of embarrassment to the party hierarchy by refusing to 
make any reference to the PS in their campaign, instead labelling their candidacy as one ‘in 
support of the presidential majority’. A third grouping, led by Hamon, totally rejected the 
‘macroncompatibilité’ of their colleagues, both in terms of active support for the presidential 
majority and the PS leadership’s attempt to cultivate an image of constructive engagement 
with Macron. Instead, the ex-presidential candidate looked to revive a union à gauche strategy 
to halt the rise of the new president’s movement, and even openly backed non-PS candidates 
against official Socialist candidates who would look to support Macron’s presidential majority. 
From both the left and the right of the PS, the traditional bond of party loyalty was being 
destroyed.
Cambadélis might have hoped to salvage as many seats as possible by adopting Macron-
friendly candidates and policy positions, and profit from the PS’s deep-seated roots in local 
communities, and its well-resourced campaigning machine which contrasts with LRM’s lack 
of infrastructure, yet this tactic failed. Cambadélis approached the leaders of other parties 
in order to reserve up to 100 seats in order to faire barrage au Front national, but bargaining 
from a position of such electoral weakness, he was predictably pushed back. Moreover, any 
PS aspirations for ‘double-ticket candidates’ with LRM were quashed by two factors: money 
and ambition. France’s state funding for parties is determined by vote share and seats, with 
parties receiving €1.42 per vote obtained in the first round of the parliamentary election, and 
around €37,280 per year for each député elected after the second round. This creates powerful 
disincentives for double-ticket candidacies. Yet, perhaps most importantly, Macron and LRM 
meant what they said about ‘neither left nor right’ and assiduously kept their presentational 
and political distance from the PS throughout. As for LFI, Mélenchon’s strategy was always 
about annihilation of, not assimilation with, the Socialist Party.
The fragility of the PS is now all too evident, with the party returning to the National 
Assembly after the parliamentary election with just 30 seats, shedding 250 députés. Its first-
round vote share (7.5 per cent) was the worst in the history of French socialism, going back 
to the foundation of the SFIO in 1905. Losses on this scale inevitably saw some significant 
symbolic defeats for the party, including First Secretary Cambadélis, who had held his seat 
in Paris for 20 years, the party’s 2017 presidential candidate, Hamon, and a number of high 
profile ministers in the Hollande administration including Myriam El Khomri and Najat 
Vallaud-Belkacem. Valls retained his seat in Essonne by just 139 votes, though he was not 
endorsed to run under a PS ticket given his open support for Macron. Scanning the electoral 
map of France today reveals that the Socialists no longer possess any real regional bastions; 
the party no longer has a single member of parliament in former Socialist strongholds 
including Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Seine-Saint-Denis, nor in the major towns of Nantes, 
Toulouse, Lyon and Marseille. Decades of work building local networks and power bases 
was largely undone in 2017 (and during the Hollande presidency more generally), and these 
will be difficult to rebuild.
Given the two-round logic of the parliamentary election, LFI was unable to build 
sufficiently on Mélenchon’s showing in the presidential election and obtained 17 seats. 
Whilst Mélenchon dreamt of Matignon, his refusal to offer a ‘consigne de vote’ against Marine 
Le Pen after the first round of the presidential election was a clear strategic error, and his cult 
of personality dominance of his political movement also made it hard for LFI parliamentary 
candidates to get heard on the campaign trail. Significantly, however, LFI did well enough 
to form its own parliamentary group, giving it a stronger voice in parliament and greater 
financial resources. The PCF surprised by increasing its seat share, claiming 10 députés 
and seemingly halting its terminal decline. With record low turn-out (just 42.64 per cent) 
casting a pall over all the results, Macron achieved a decisive parliamentary majority of 350 
seats, including Bayrou’s 42 MoDem députés, although this was less than the 400+seats 
suggested by first-round polling. Amidst the massive influx of new parliamentarians, the 
presidential majority’s new parliamentary bloc contains 140 women (48 per cent), which 
Macron was quick to vaunt as ‘the most gender balanced’ in French history, although all the 
key parliamentary posts went to men.
The French political landscape today
The Socialists were decimated in the parliamentary election, and although arguably they have 
been here before—reduced to 53 députés in their crushing 1993 defeat—this time is different. 
Not only is the scale of this parliamentary defeat bigger, but the party’s devastatingly poor 
presidential vote is unprecedented. Whilst the PS did collapse in 1993, it retained strong local 
electoral bases capable of helping it revive national electoral support. Moreover, Mitterrand 
was still president at the time, and just two years later in 1995, PS candidate Jospin received 
47 per cent of the second-round vote. The political landscape around the PS has changed 
fundamentally in the last 12 months, and its position as France’s mainstream left party no 
longer seems secure. For the first time since 1962, the PS is neither in government nor the 
main opposition party; its reign as a true parti d’alternance may have come to an end. Not 
only will the PS parliamentary group struggle to make its voice heard, but the PS is, more 
than ever, a deeply divided movement. Furthermore, the electorally crippled party cannot 
hope to impose discipline upon what few PS députés remain. Given that the majoritarian 
voting system of France’s major elections punishes parties outside of the dominant two, 
we may have seen the end of the comforting bi-polarity that produced periodic electoral 
swings in the PS’s favour. Furthermore, the financial implications of the 2017 election alone 
raise questions about the PS’s ongoing viability. In the wake of its poor electoral results, the 
PS is set to lose around €15 million of its state aid funding. There has even been talk of the 
party selling its historic headquarters in the Rue de Solférino.
Immediately after the second round of the legislatives, Cambadélis resigned as First 
Secretary, stating that the left ‘has to change everything’. He paved the way for an interim 
direction collégiale to lead the party’s renewal with its own distinct image and programme. 
This interim leadership team has been tasked with rebuilding the party, pursuing a ‘ni Macron 
ni Mélenchon’ line, yet this will not be straightforward as the PS must redefine itself within 
the void created by the exit of party figureheads from both its left and right wings, and the 
party remains divided in (at least) three groupings. A rump of the PS will continue to limp 
on through the new parliament, pursuing its ‘ni-ni’ strategy, but the question is whether 
anyone will notice. The PS’s social liberal right sees LRM as offering a more attractive home, 
and path to power, as seen in Valls’s decision to quit the party in favour of sitting with the 
presidential majority. The left of the party argue for a more radical break with the Hollande 
quinquennat is necessary, evidenced in Hamon’s decision also to leave the PS and form his 
own movement that will ‘go beyond political parties’. In this endeavour, Hamon’s advances 
made to Mélenchon have once again been rebuffed.
One of the most striking consequences of the 2017 parliamentary election is the collapse 
of the left altogether, and thus the demise of bipolarity in French electoral politics. Of the PS’s 
30 députés, around a dozen are ‘Macron compatible’, whilst the left-wing frondeur movement 
has almost been wiped out from the Socialist parliamentary group. Officially the PS opted 
to enter the opposition by voting against confidence in the new government of Edouard 
Phillippe on 4 July. Yet, revealing the party’s inability to command discipline or loyalty and 
indicating its desire not to cause further instability, it retained the possibility of Socialist 
députés abstaining, an option eventually taken up by the majority of PS députés. Three 
députés defied the weakened PS leadership to vote with Phillippe’s government.
Mélenchon has promised to provide vocal opposition to Macron’s administration 
‘in the Assembly and in the street’, and has been customarily forthright and colourful in 
criticising Macron’s labour market reforms, described as ‘El Khomri ++ law’ (in reference to 
the contentious and unpopular labour market reform introduced under Hollande). Yet the 
force of this opposition to Macron is weakened by the perennially fractured composition of 
the French left, with the PS, LFI and the PCF choosing to remain separate from each other in 
their parliamentary groups. In demanding voting discipline around LFI’s own programme, 
L'Avenir en commun, Mélenchon has retained his hostile stance towards the Socialists and 
once again aggravated tensions with the Communists. With seven parliamentary groups 
(even LR have split, with a splinter ‘constructive LR’ group also forming), this parliament is 
the most fractured of the Fifth Republic. Without a clear and forceful opposition, the political 
strength of Macron’s majority looks to be further enhanced.
France’s youngest ever president can also look forward to enjoying a political economic 
environment his predecessor could only have hoped for, with economic growth returning 
and unemployment falling. After five long years of fiscal consolidation, economic conditions 
within the eurozone have finally picked up, and the economic upturn could give Macron’s 
mandate a significant boost. In addition, he will benefit from improved relations with 
Germany. Though rapid and significant change remains unlikely, in the context of the UK’s 
exit from the European Union and the threat of a Le Pen victory in France the noises from 
Brussels and Berlin were much more positive in 2017 than in 2012. Macron has pushed 
immediately for a range of ambitious reforms at the EU level, all of which were put on the 
table by Hollande, including a eurozone finance minister and shared budget.
Yet, the next five years will not be plain sailing for Macron. Very early on, several of Macron’s 
ministers were forced to resign. Most symbolically, after seeking to implement a projet de 
loi de moralisation de la vie publique, Macron forced his MoDem coalition partner, François 
Bayrou, to step down as Justice Minister amidst accusations of a MoDem ‘fake jobs’ scandal 
involving misused European Parliament funds. Programmatically, Macron’s first governing 
efforts faced the familiar challenge of enacting fiscal retrenchment to meet the 3 per cent 
deficit target, whilst seeking to honour his campaign commitments and property and wealth 
tax reduction pledges. Public sector efficiency savings are the mooted means to square that 
circle–but we have heard that before. Flagship plans to flexibilise French labour law, to be fast-
tracked through the legislative process by ‘ordinance’ rather than normal parliamentary bills, 
remain controversial and unpopular with unions and what’s left of France’s parliamentary 
opposition.
Furthermore, should the fractured left reconfigure and rebuild itself, the traditional 
bipolarising logic of France’s two-round electoral system (which punished centrist forces 
throughout the Fifth Republic) could return at Macron’s expense. It must be remembered 
that, despite its current dominance in parliament, the record abstention levels mean that LRM 
obtained a historically low 32.3 per cent of the vote (7.3 million votes) in the first round of the 
2017 parliamentary election. In comparison, the mainstream right lost the 2012 parliamentary 
election to the PS while claiming 34.6 per cent (9 million votes). Macron’s new movement 
has achieved an extraordinary amount in an inordinately short space of time, and with it 
has transformed French politics. Yet, there remains much work to do to solidify its support 
in order to remain resilient in the face of resurgent competition from both its left and right.
Conclusion
This article has suggested that in order to understand the contemporary state of French 
socialism, Hollande’s programmatic and party leadership failures must be situated within 
an understanding of longer-term institutional constraints for the PS, of factional in-fighting 
associated predominantly with the presidential logic of the Fifth Republic and the tension 
within the party between the two cultures of socialism. Although operating within an 
extremely difficult macroeconomic and institutional environment, Hollande’s management of 
his own economic programme had adverse economic and political consequences. Hollande’s 
limitations as president and party leader were exposed as the Socialist’s administration’s 
macroeconomic programme dampened the French recovery, whilst its shifting distributional 
dynamic favoured business over households. Understanding these failings, and situating 
them within an institutional account of the PS within the Fifth Republic helps explain why 
the PS collapsed in 2017.
Caught between LRM’s self-avowed pragmatic centrism and staunchly pro-European 
social liberalism on the one hand, and the more radical, muscularly leftist, rhetoric and 
eurosceptic stance of Mélenchon’s LFI, the emaciated PS is struggling to make its voice heard. 
In the history of the PS, only Mitterrand demonstrated the political acumen and strength to 
achieve an enduring synthesis between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ lefts, historically a necessity 
for a dominant left party within the Fifth Republic. Ultimately, the differences between these 
two groups have never been resolved, and Hollande’s attempts to practice l'art de la synthèse 
et du compromis unravelled dramatically after 2012. Whilst Grunberg and Bergounioux’s 
model predicts a period of ‘remorse’ after periods in government, this time it seems that the 
Socialist administration’s failures have provoked a more significant reconfiguration on the 
left and the wider French party and political systems. The compromises made in power and 
Hollande’s programmatic and leadership failings raised the traditional tensions that exist 
within PS factions to stratospheric levels. The PS is now struggling to continue operating after 
a period of near total electoral collapse, with party funds heavily diminished and seemingly 
no clear présidentiable ready and capable of pulling the party back from the brink. The 
rise of a new centrist movement led by a charismatic young leader has lured a core of the 
rocardienne right away from the PS. The combative LFI have laid fresh claims to the radical-
left space within French politics. This crisis of French socialism really is different, and deeper, 
than earlier PS debacles.
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